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Abstract—As we advance towards Smart Cities, autonomous
vehicles and the avalanche of IoT devices proposed for the future,
we need to give careful consideration to how easily compromised
nodes/devices can impact network state. Current proposals for
autonomous smart devices typically use cellular networks as
the backhaul or final hop. These devices will leverage existing
trust-based client-side channel metrics, such as channel quality
indicator (CQI), when the base-station determines scheduling
decisions.
In this short paper, we investigate the scheduling impact of
a malicious device when it changes its channel metrics, so as
to improve its download rate or even to negate the download
rate of others. We utilise real-time 4K ultra-high definition video
delivery as an example of high throughput demand application
and compare the delivery rates of multiple devices in an open-
source 5G simulated NS-3 network. Our results illustrate that
when a malicious client deceives the scheduler, the other clients
in the network have a noticeable decrease in both viewable quality
and underlying delivery rate (25% decrease in the average video
quality across the non malicious clients).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern age, most network traffic originates from,
interacts with or is destined for cellular devices. As we
advance towards the billions of autonomous smart nodes,
such as vehicular and IoT, destined for deployment over the
coming years, cellular networks will become the first/last hop
for practically all network traffic. The impact of how these
devices will interact with network services, such as web traffic,
video streaming, social media and messaging is forcing ISPs
(cellular operators) to continue to improve their core network
infrastructure and invest in new cellular technologies. The
next iteration of the cellular technology is known as 5G,
and promises high delivery rates, coupled with extremely low
latency and overall improved reliability.
While network traffic can have inherent security at its
core (https, VPN, encryption), the final cellular hop has a
number of inherent trust-based metrics upon which traffic
scheduling is determined. In current cellular networks, the
download rate for a given client (allocated resource blocks)
is typically determined by the base station using metrics from
the device, such as the channel quality indicator (CQI). This
mandates a level of trust between the device (the user) and
the base station (ISP). As most current devices are not open-
source hardware/software, modifications to the core functions
of the device is limited, such that these trust-based metrics are
inherently difficult to modify. With the introduction of open-
sourced communication systems, such as software-defined
radio, as well as the multitude of IoT nodes being deployed,
the rate of compromised or malicious devices in the network,
with access to core functionality, will only increase.
In this short paper, we investigate the relationship between
CQI value and allocated throughput, when a device mali-
ciously change their channel metrics. We assume that an
attacker cannot interfere with base stations or the network
back end infrastructure and only has the ability to modify
the behaviour of an end device. Specifically, the attacker can
only modify performance data reported to the base station.
The possible goals of the attacker include 1) Gain a better
allocation of bandwidth than would be assigned normally,
2) Prevent other users from obtaining their fair bandwidth
allocation and 3) Prevent other users from using services at
all (push bandwidth allocation modification towards DoS).
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
A low rate of malicious devices in a network can greatly
impact on the Quality of Service (QoS) of all other devices
within the range of the same base station. For 3G networks, it
has been shown that if just 10% of the clients have malicious
intent, a 2-second end-to-end inter-packet transmission delay
for VOIP can be seen [1]. While sophisticated attacks can
capture up to 77% of the allocated time slots [2]. For 4G,
the outcome of the attacks is considerably worse, as just two
malicious users can cause denial of service for all other users
of the same cell requesting TCP-based applications [3].
These startling results, motivate us to investigate the impact
of these malicious clients in a 5G network. We utilise an open-
source simulated cellular testbed, namely the DI5GUISE [4]
framework for 5G evaluation. DI5GUISE is a fully modifiable
and extendable NS-3 based tool and offers a real-time hybrid
physical and simulated infrastructure to evaluate high through-
put applications. DI5GUISE extends the NS-3 mmwave [5]
module which offers a full-stack 5G infrastructure. Build and
usage details for DI5GUISE, are available on the website 1.
In our evaluation, we utilise adaptive video delivery [6] as a
means of illustrating how changing the download scheduling
allocation can impact on the view-able quality perceived by a
user. Adaptive video is designed so that for each streaming
video clip, there exists a range of quality rates (average
video encoding rate in Kbps). Each video quality rate is
further broken into segments, where each segment permits
1http://www.cs.ucc.ie/misl/research/software/di5guise
TABLE I
COLUMN NOTATION USED IN TABLE II AND TABLE III
Header Description
Avg quality average view-able quality per segment in Kbps
Avg del rate average download rate per segment in Kbps
Avg del time average delivery time per segment in seconds
Num stalls number of stalls
Stall Dur total stall duration in seconds
a piece of the video to be downloaded (typically in the
duration of seconds of content). Each rate offers options
such as a different resolution, frame per second, and thus
produce different perceived quality levels. This permits the
client to select the correct quality rate segment which best
reflects the cellular throughput rate seen at the device at that
moment in time, so as to maximise perceived quality. In our
simulated networks, both with and without malicious devices,
we compare clients average download rate (Kbps), delivery
time, the average view-able quality at the device (Kbps), and
also highlight issues that can occur when the network changes
drastically, such as video re-buffering and stalls. Investigating
issues such as decoding the underlying modulation and coding
scheme, spectral efficiency, and associated packet loss rates,
is left for future work.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In our NS-3 5G mmwave evaluation, four clients range
between 25m and 35m in distance from a single base station.
We utilise a rural macro-channel scenario (RMa), with a 3GPP
propagation loss model (3GPPprop), and a Transmission Time
Interval (TTI) mac scheduler. For all evaluation scenarios, we
stream five minutes of 4K adaptive video content to a number
of video clients, who will adapt the quality of their streaming
video clip depending on their scheduled throughput rate. For
the evaluation with a malicious client, we maximise the CQI
value of Client one. The notation used in the column headers
of Table II and Table III is shown in Table I.
Table II illustrates the client metrics when there are no
malicious clients in the network. We can see that the average
quality rate per segment across all four clients is approximately
11,388 Kbps, which is reflected in at least two of the clients
(denoting a fair allocation across all user space). We see
similar equality over delivery rate and delivery time for all four
clients. Delivery time is reflective of average video quality as
higher quality takes longer to download. There is noticeable
stalls in three of the clients, but this can occur when the client
makes the wrong decision for the next video segment and
spends too long waiting for the segment to arrive (typically
occurs when the network throughput drops and the client is
stuck downloading a segment with a large transmission cost).
In Table III reflects the client metrics when client 1 is
malicious and maximise the CQI value sent to the scheduler.
We not only see a much lower average quality rate per segment
across all four clients, approximately 9,290 Kbps, but also a
marked decrease in the overall average quality rate for the non
malicious clients. These lower average values are also noted in
the delivery rate and delivery time of Clients two to four. One
TABLE II
5G CLIENT METRICS WITH NO MALICIOUS CLIENTS
Client Avg quality Avg del rate Avg del time Num stalls Stall Dur
1 11,508 20,091 2.435 0 0
2 8,934 16,589 2.147 1 3.337
3 13,477 22,141 2.738 2 5.22
4 11,636 20,618 2.568 3 3.395
positive item is that two of the client no longer stall during
playback, but Client 3 has seen a 100% increase in both stall
events and overall duration.
TABLE III
5G CLIENT METRICS WITH CLIENT 1 AS THE MALICIOUS CLIENT
Client Avg quality Avg del rate Avg del time Num stalls Stall Dur
1 11,997 20,221 2.706 0 0
2 7,246 14,823 2.064 0 0
3 9,865 17,318 2.433 4 10.422
4 8,144 16,030 2.221 0 0
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion: It is interesting to note that while client 1 is
maximising the CQI value sent to the scheduler, there is only
a 4% increase in average video quality. This increase does not
reflect the higher resource block allocation by the scheduler,
and the marked decrease in video quality of the other client.
Further work is required to extract the relevant features from
the 5G scheduler, so as to better compare this relationship.
Conclusion: In this paper we investigated the impact on
4K adaptive video quality in a multi-user 5G network, when a
malicious client utilises existing trust-based channel metrics to
deceive the cellular scheduler so as to maximise its download
bandwidth allocation.
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